This paper analyzes pharmaceutical producers' (of branded and generic drugs) pricing decisions in a context which combines the classical Hotelling framework (commonly adopted in the literature) with the possibility that consumers'demands are price elastic. We analyze with particular interest two commonly adopted reimbursement mechanisms: …xed percentage reimbursement (FPR) and reference pricing (RP). We …nd that assuming an elastic demand has a signi…cant impact under a RP mechanism, as it allows …rms to raise their prices when the copayment rate increases. Contrary to previous literature, we show that RP may be worse than FPR in terms of social welfare for su¢ ciently high copayment rates. From a policy viewpoint, our results indicate that the introduction of RP is not necessarily always bene…cial (compared to FPR) and thus constitute a model towards which all reimbursement mechanisms should converge.
Introduction
The extant literature contains a number of strong claims on the relative properties of di¤erent pharmaceutical reimbursement mechanisms, and especially on the merits of reference pricing as compared to …xed percentage reimbursement schemes. In this paper, we show that some of those claims are driven by speci…c modelling assumptions and would, at least, be mitigated under more general assumptions.
In a large number of countries, individuals only pay a fraction of the price of the prescription pharmaceuticals they consume, whilst the government or other third-party payers are responsible for the remainder. Two widely adopted mechanisms to determine the relative contribution of the patient and the government are …xed percentage reimbursement (FPR) and reference pricing (RP).
Under FPR, the government pays a …xed percentage of the pharmaceutical's price and the patient is responsible for the remainder. Thus, the patient's payment corresponds to a …xed percentage of the price, also known as the copayment rate. By contrast, under RP, within each cluster of pharmaceuticals 1 , one is chosen as the 'reference' for the determination of the government's contribution: the government only pays a …xed fraction of the 'reference'pharmaceutical's price, even if the consumer actually buys a more expensive alternative. Naturally, RP is only viable if more than one pharmaceutical is available for the treatment of the same condition and is especially used when low-price generic competition exists. 2 Reference pricing has attracted a lot of attention in the literature and a large consensus has emerged regarding its merits. For instance, Brekke et al. (2007) show that RP leads to lower prices than FPR mechanisms. They further show that the two mechanisms are equivalent from a social welfare perspective but RP is superior if, adopting a public payer's perspective, the producers' pro…ts are excluded from the analysis. Merino-Castelló (2003) also shows that RP enhances price competition and leads to signi…cant reductions in the price of branded pharmaceuticals. On a cautionary note, whilst also acknowledging the potential bene…ts of this mechanism, Miraldo (2009) notes that if …rms anticipate the introduction of RP, they will optimally revise their prices upwards ahead of that introduction, thus signi…cantly limiting its expected e¤ectiveness. Nevertheless, …rms sell di¤erentiated versions of a pharmaceutical, with di¤erentiation being represented by their position along a Hotelling interval, and compete by (simultaneously) setting prices; consumers are uniformly distributed along that interval and their position represents their preferences towards 1 Several criteria could be used to cluster pharmaceuticals: chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic (Miraldo, 2009 ). 2 For a detailed review of reference pricing, see López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000).
the potential varieties of the product; any mismatch between the locations of …rms and consumers generates a utility loss to the latter, often described as a 'transportation cost', which is added to the price of the pharmaceutical; each consumer buys one unit of the pharmaceutical if total costprice plus transportation cost -does not exceed his reservation price. Authors commonly assume this restriction to be ful…lled thus implying that every consumer buys one unit of the product. In this type of setting, it is not surprising that social welfare is equal across reimbursement regimes (e.g. as in Brekke et al., 2007) , as there are no quantity e¤ ects. Reimbursement regimes merely determine who captures the surplus created but not its amount. This paper's main purpose is to analyze the impact of reimbursement mechanisms such as FPR and RP in a setting where each consumer's demand depends on prices. This strikes us as a realistic assumption, at least for some health conditions. Consider, for instance, conditions that result in recurring episodes of symptoms of variable intensity, such as sleeping disorders, muscular pain or migraines. It is entirely plausible that the patient will react to the price of the pharmaceutical he has been prescribed when deciding whether to take it on a speci…c occasion. Thus, over time, the quantity he buys may be inversely related to price. On the other hand, our setting may be less adequate for pharmaceuticals that are used to treat serious non-recurring conditions, in which case the patient will often be limited to the choice of following his physician's prescription, and buying the pharmaceutical, or not buying it at all. In this case, the standard Hotelling framework used by (2011), who …nd that, under RP, prices are independent of the copayment rate. Second, we show that, for su¢ ciently high copayment rates, social welfare under RP is lower than under FPR, a result which runs contrary to the previous literature boasting the merits of RP.
The di¤erences with respect to previous literature's results are mainly determined by the impact of the elastic demand assumption on the properties of RP mechanisms, as our results for FPR are in line with the previous literature. In a nutshell, whereas under FPR an increase in the copayment rate has no impact on the relative prices faced by the consumer, as all prices rise by the same percentage, under RP this is not so: an increase in the copayment rate changes the relative prices faced by the consumer in favor of the more expensive pharmaceuticals. Ceteris paribus, this would increase their market share but their producers take the opportunity to raise their prices. Prices being strategic complements, other …rms respond by also raising prices. Thus, in equilibrium, higher copayment rates lead to higher prices, explaining our …rst result. Under FPR, social welfare does not depend on the copayment rate: …rms''mark-up'their prices (and pro…ts) in an inversely proportional manner with respect to the copayment rate such that the amount the consumer has to pay does not change (and, thus, consumer surplus does not depend on the copayment rate). Under RP, however, higher copayment rates lead to higher prices and lower consumption levels and, thus, to a fall in consumer surplus that is only partially compensated by the increase in pro…ts (net of government expenditure 
Model
Our model is loosely inspired by Rath and Zhao (2001) , who combine horizontal di¤erentiation, a la Hotelling, with elastic demand for each consumer.
Consumers are assumed to buy a Hicksian composite good (denoted by h) and a di¤erentiated pharmaceutical (denoted by d). This di¤erentiated product exists in two varieties: branded (in which case d = b) and generic (in which case d = g). We use the terms 'incumbent'and 'entrant'to refer to the producers of the branded and generic varieties of the di¤erentiated product, respectively.
These two …rms compete by simultaneously setting prices.
The consumer's utility from consuming q h units of the Hicksian good and q d units of the dif-
where f d is a disutility parameter discussed in more detail below. 3 In this utility function, increased consumption of the di¤erentiated product reduces a negative element that can be interpreted as 'disease'or 'discomfort'. The marginal utility associated with consuming the di¤erentiated product is decreasing, i.e. increasing consumption levels contribute gradually less towards the treatment of the underlying health condition.
The consumer's budget constraint is given by p h q h + p d q d = m; where m represents the consumer's income. When we normalize p h = 1; the demand functions that result from utility maximization subject to the budget constraint are given by:
Note, in particular, that demand for the di¤erentiated product is isoelastic and the (absolute value of) demand elasticity is equal to 1=2:
We assume that consumers di¤er in the degree to which they distrust the generic pharmaceutical to be therapeutically equivalent to the branded product. This seems plausible not only among the general public but among trained physicians as well. Kesselheim translates onto treatment e¤ect equivalence is still ongoing, but at the very least suggests that it is plausible and possibly rational for a consumer to "suspect" that a generic drug may not have the same treatment e¤ect as the branded drug. 4;5 The parameter f d in the utility function measures the utility loss the consumer su¤ers by buying a drug he trusts less than the branded product. By de…nition, f b = 0, as the branded product is the benchmark against which trust is measured. As for consumers that buy the generic, we assume f g (c) = tc. The parameter c 2 [0; 1] measures the "level of distrust". The parameter t > 0 measures the negative impact of this distrust on the consumer's utility. We assume c to be
Our model can be interpreted in two ways. As an analogy with previous models in the RP literature, it is possible to describe the [0; 1] interval as a Hotelling line. In this interpretation, the entrant is located at the left end of the interval and uses mill pricing: consumers bear transportation costs. The incumbent, however, uses delivered pricing, making its location not directly relevant to 4 Kesselheim et al. (2008) conclude, in their meta-analysis of various studies, that generics and branded drugs have similar clinical outcomes in the treatment of cardiovascular diseases; by contrast, Borgherini (2003) reaches an opposite conclusion -that bioequivalence and therapeutic e¤ectiveness are not necessarily the same -for psychoactive drugs; in line with those …ndings, Meredith (2003) suggests that average measures of bioequivalence are not necessarily su¢ cient to ensure treatment e¤ect equivalence for some drugs and notes that "...measures of bioequivalence that take into account variability among subjects and between healthy populations and patient populations may be more appropriate" (p. 2887). 5 Kobayashi et al. (2011) discusses evidence from various countries (United States, Spain, Portugal, Germany and Norway) where consumers were (or are) skeptic on the e¤ectiveness and safety of generic drugs. In a study on the underlying reasons for generic underuse in Portugal, Quintal and Mendes (2011) …nd that over 40% of respondents justify it due to their "lack of trust" in generics.
the determination of the equilibrium prices. It is more intuitive, however, to interpret the model as one of vertical di¤erentiation: in this interpretation, the [0; 1] interval is a scale that measures the subjective perceived vertical di¤erentiation between branded pharmaceutical and generic. A consumer with c = 0 shows "no distrust", i.e. believes the generic to be fully equivalent to the branded pharmaceutical. On the other hand, c = 1 implies that the consumer has the maximum level of distrust conceivable for a drug that has gone through the licensing process. Thus, if branded and generic prices'were equal, only the consumer with c = 0 would be indi¤erent between the two; all others would strictly prefer the branded drug. However, if the generic is cheaper than the branded drug, consumers face a trade-o¤ between their disutility in generic consumption (associated with their distrust of generics) and the higher utility in consumption they can obtain because of lower generic prices.
Further note that we assume this disutility to be independent of the quantity consumed (i.e. lump sum). Stahl (1987) , Anderson et al. (1992) and Rath and Zhao (2001) justify this assumption by noting that in standard Hotelling models, where this disutility is a transportation cost associated with the distance between the consumer and the producer's geographical location, the act of consumption requires a shopping trip, whose cost is largely invariant to the quantity consumed and which translates into economies of scale. In a similar vein, we can regard the disutility associated with purchasing the generic variety as a (…xed) consumer-speci…c distrust in its treatment e¤ec-tiveness, which does not depend on the quantity he decides to consume of that drug. Assuming a …xed disutility in the consumption of a generic is equivalent to a decreasing average disutility per unit consumed (somewhat equivalent to the economies of scale mentioned above). 6 In this context, consumer c 2 [0; 1] obtains the following utility from consuming the branded
Similarly, the utility of consuming the generic product is u g (q h ; q g ) = q h 1=q g f g (c) = q h 1=q g tc; because we assume f g (c) = tc: The choice of which variety of the di¤erentiated product (branded or generic) to buy is endogenous: consumers for which u b u g prefer the branded pharmaceutical, whilst all others choose instead to consume the generic. The quantities consumed are given by the demand functions above. Note that the model implicitly assumes that each consumer purchases branded or generic pharmaceuticals, but not both simultaneously: consumers compare the maximum utility they can obtain (given their budget constraint) by consuming (a certain quantity of) each pharmaceutical variety -branded or generic -and choose whichever yields the highest utility.
Both the choice between the generic and branded product as well as the quantities consumed depend on the prices charged to the consumer and these depend on the existence and properties of the reimbursement mechanism. We analyze two reimbursement schemes: a …xed percentage reimbursement (FPR) mechanism (henceforth represented by the superscript 'F'), in which consumers pay the same percentage (copayment rate), 2 [0; 1], of their desired product's headline price (the headline price being the price set by the producer); and a reference pricing (RP) mechanism (henceforth represented by the superscript 'R'), where the consumer's copayment is based on the price of the 'reference'pharmaceutical -typically the generic because it is cheaper and hence leads to a lower reimbursement expenditure by the third-party payer. Under a RP mechanism, the consumer must pay a percentage (copayment rate) of the reference pharmaceutical's price if he chooses to purchase it, but if he chooses to purchase other pharmaceuticals in a predetermined reference group he must also pay the full price di¤erence between that pharmaceutical's price and the reference price. In order to highlight the di¤erences between these two reimbursement mechanisms, under a FPR mechanism, e¤ective prices -by which we refer to the price paid by the consumer -are given by:p
We de…ne p F k (k = b; g) to be the headline prices set by …rms when the FPR mechanism is in place. By contrast, under a reference pricing mechanism, the e¤ective prices are given by (we assume that the reference pharmaceutical is the generic and that the copayment rate, ; is similar across mechanisms):p
where p R k (k = b; g) are the headline prices set by …rms when the RP mechanism is in place. We will also refer to the no reimbursement (NR) scenario, whereby patients must support the headline prices in full; this is equivalent to setting = 1 in equation (2) or (3). Finally, production costs are assumed to be zero and the total number of consumers is set equal to 1, i.e. product quantities can be interpreted as market shares.
Pricing

Fixed Percentage Reimbursement
Under a …xed percentage reimbursement mechanism, where the e¤ective prices for the branded and generic drugs arep F b = p F b andp F g = p F g respectively, the "marginal consumer", c F b:g ; who is indi¤erent between buying the branded (b) or generic (g) pharmaceuticals is found by solving
As the total number of consumers is assumed to be equal to one, c F b:g gives us the market share of the entrant (which produces the generic drug) and 1 c F b:g is the market share of the incumbent (which produces the branded drug)
vector. Using equation (2), the demand functions are thus given by:
The pro…t functions are given by
the incumbent and entrant respectively. Maximizing these functions with respect to p F b and p F g respectively we obtain the best-response functions:
In a Nash equilibrium, when we insert the best response function p F g = 1 4 p F b in the …rst equation of (6), the equilibrium value of p F b is the solution of this non-linear equation:
This equation's solution is necessarily an approximate root, which leads to the following Nash equilibrium prices:
Therefore, equilibrium individually consumed quantities are given by:
whilst overall quantities sold are given by:
At the equilibrium prices, c F b:g = 1=3; which implies that whilst each individual consumer purchases more units of the generic drug than of the branded drug, the latter is sold to a larger number of consumers. These two e¤ects cancel each other out and in equilibrium each producer sells exactly the same quantity: 2=t units.
In equilibrium, pro…ts are: 
Under a …xed percentage reimbursement scheme, …rms mark-up their headline prices in an inversely proportional manner relative to the copayment rate: the higher is the copayment rate, the lower is that mark-up under a FPR mechanism. This implies that the e¤ective price paid by consumers is equal in both cases and therefore equilibrium quantities are also the same,
e. …rms also increase their pro…ts in an inversely proportional manner relative to the copayment rate. Headline prices, p b and p g ; are lowest when the patient's copayment rate is maximal, i.e.
when = 1:
Consumer surplus (CS) is given by the sum of the surplus of buying the branded and generic pharmaceuticals (in equilibrium, c F b:g = 1=3):
Note that CS does not depend on : as outlined above, the existence of a copayment rate has no impact on the e¤ective prices consumers must face,p b andp g : Hence, the existence of a FPR mechanism (through parameter ) does not a¤ect consumer surplus, i.e. CS F = CS N R .
Total pro…ts, which are equivalent to total pharmaceutical expenditure, are given by:
Government (or other third-party payers) expenditure with pharmaceuticals is a proportion
(1 ) of total pharmaceutical expenditure:
Note that government expenditure is decreasing with : This result has two causes: (i) …rst, there is the direct e¤ect that as increases, the reimbursement rate (1 ) ; applicable to total pharmaceutical expenditure, decreases; on the other hand, there is the strategic e¤ect that producers respond to higher copayment rates by reducing headline prices, thus bringing down total pharmaceutical expenditure.
Reference Pricing
Under a reference pricing mechanism, the e¤ective prices for the branded and generic drugs arê (3)) and the "marginal consumer", c R b:g ; who is indi¤erent between buying the branded (b) or generic (g) pharmaceuticals is again found by solving u b = u g , which in this case yields:
Similarly to the FPR case, c R b:g gives us the market share of the entrant (which produces the generic drug) under a RP mechanism. Each consumer in the 
When we maximize the latter pro…t function with respect to p R g , the …rst-order condition for the entrant (after some simplifying steps) yields:
This non-linear equation has two solutions, one of which results in p R b < p R g whenever > 1=4: This violates the assumption that the generic drug is the reference pharmaceutical because it is cheaper, and hence the best-response function of the entrant is assumed to correspond to this equation's other solution:
Maximizing the incumbent's pro…t function with respect to p R b and setting it equal to zero (@ b p R =@p R b = 0) results in the following …rst-order condition:
Substituting the entrant's best-response function (equation (17)) into this equation, we obtain the incumbent's Nash equilibrium price and subsequently substituting it into equation (17), we also obtain the entrant's equilibrium price:
Under a RP mechanism, the equilibrium individually consumed quantities are given by:
At the equilibrium prices, c R b:
g is an increasing function of ) which implies that, as under the FPR mechanism, whilst each individual consumer purchases more units of the generic drug than of the branded drug, the latter is sold to a larger number of consumers. However, also as under the FPR mechanism, these two e¤ects cancel each other out and each producer sells exactly the same quantity: 2= 1=2 t units.
It is particularly relevant to highlight the following (novel) result:
Proposition 1 Under a RP mechanism, both headline (p R = p R b ; p R g ) and e¤ ective equilibrium prices (p R = p R b ;p R g ) are increasing in :
Proof. In equilibrium, under a RP mechanism, headline prices are given by equation (19), whose derivative with respect to is:
Both derivatives are positive for any t > 0 and 2 [0; 1] : E¤ective equilibrium prices are easily calculated using equations (3) and (19),
and
The derivative of e¤ective prices with respect to is:
Again, both derivatives are positive for any t > 0 and 2 [0; 1] :
When we compare these equilibrium prices with those obtained under a FPR mechanism, we also obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 Under a RP mechanism, both headline (p R = p R b ; p R g ) and e¤ ective equilibrium prices (p R = p R b ;p R g ) are never higher than under a FPR mechanism.
Proof. Recall that headline equilibrium prices under a FPR mechanism are those given by equation (8), whilst under a RP mechanism they are given by equation (19). Using those expressions, it is straightforward to show that p F b > p R b for any 2 [0; 1) and p F b = p R b when = 1: Similarly, p F g > p R g for any 2 [0; 1) and p F g = p R g when = 1: E¤ective equilibrium prices under FPR are easily calculated using equations (2) and (8) decreasing with whilst under a RP mechanism they are increasing (Proposition 1). Under a FPR mechanism, an increase in the copayment rate ( ) would lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in e¤ective prices, therefore reducing the quantity consumed of both the branded and generic pharmaceuticals. In this context, both …rms …nd it pro…t-maximizing to reduce headline prices and, thus, to reduce the (negative) impact on demand. It turns out that, in equilibrium, this reduction is su¢ cient for e¤ective prices not to change and, thus, for individually consumed quantities and overall sold quantities of both goods to remain constant. Inevitably, this hurts both …rms'pro…ts.
As mentioned earlier, this result is similar to that of Brekke et at. (2007) . An increase in the copayment rate leads to a reduction in total pharmaceutical expenditure (which is equal to profits) and, consequently, to a reduction in government expenditure, but consumer surplus remains unchanged. From a di¤erent point of view, reimbursement through a FPR mechanism can be seen as a public subsidy received by …rms; as the copayment rate increases (i.e. as the reimbursement rate decreases), this public subsidy decreases (and becomes equal to zero when = 1).
Under a RP mechanism, an increase in (ceteris paribus) would lead to an increase in e¤ective prices by the same amount. However, because it is lower, the e¤ective price of the generic would increase by more than the e¤ective price of the branded pharmaceutical in percentage terms. In comparative terms, the branded product would become relatively less expensive, thus attracting some of the consumers that were previously buying the generic. In this context, the incumbent …nds it pro…t-maximizing to respond to the increase in the copayment rate with an increase in its headline price. As prices are strategic complements, the entrant does the same. In equilibrium, the increase in the copayment rate coupled with the increase in headline prices unequivocally increases e¤ective prices and reduces individually consumed quantities as well as overall demand for both pharmaceuticals.
Note that, as shown in Proposition 2, headline and e¤ective prices are higher under a FPR mechanism (except for = 1; in which case they are equal). This suggests that RP is more Under a RP mechanism, in equilibrium, pro…ts are:
7 Note that the result in Proposition 2 does not depend on the value of t: This assumption is made here merely with the objective of obtaining a graphical representation of the results and understanding their rationale. Proof. For the incumbent,
For the entrant,
this is positive only when < 1=4: As argued above, an increase in works to the incumbent's advantage, as it allows it to raise headline prices and pro…ts. By contrast, the entrant's pro…ts are only increasing with when the copayment rate is relatively low ( < 1=4); above that threshold, the entrant's pro…ts are decreasing with ; as it …nds the net e¤ect of higher headline and e¤ective prices and lower demand to be negative.
Consumer surplus (CS) is given by the sum of the surplus of buying the branded and generic pharmaceuticals (in equilibrium, c R b:g = 1=2 = 1 + 2 1=2 ):
Note that consumer surplus under a RP mechanism is decreasing with . This is to be expected because e¤ective prices are increasing with (Proposition 1). Total pro…ts, which are equivalent to total pharmaceutical expenditure, are given by:
Thus, overall pro…ts are an increasing function of : as increases, the increase in pro…ts of the incumbent is su¢ cient to o¤set any reduction in pro…ts by the entrant. Government (or other thirdparty payers) expenditure with pharmaceuticals is a proportion (1 ) of total pharmaceutical expenditure:
Corollary 2 Below a certain threshold ( 0 ' 0:14); government expenditure is increasing with :
This derivative is positive whenever is below the threshold 0 ' 0:14:
For low values of , government expenditure is increasing with : producers respond to higher copayment rates by increasing prices but, at these low levels of copayment, this has little impact on demand; resulting price rises lead to a higher pharmaceutical expenditure which implies higher reimbursements. Above a certain threshold ( 0 ' 0:14), this no longer is the case: the reduced reimbursement rate applied to higher headline prices and lower total demand decreases government expenditure.
Welfare analysis
We now turn our attention to the welfare implications of our results. We …rst focus on social welfare (SW) -the sum of consumer and producer surplus minus government expenditure with pharmaceuticals -and show that:
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold value (~ = 2=3) below which social welfare is higher under a RP mechanism and above which social welfare is higher (or equal) under a FPR mechanism.
Proof. Under a FPR mechanism, social welfare is given by SW F = CS F + F G F . Using the expressions in equations (12), (13) and (14) we obtain:
By contrast, under a RP mechanism, social welfare is given by SW R = CS R + R G R . Using the expressions in equations (25), (26) and (27) we obtain:
The di¤erence between social welfare under the two reimbursement mechanisms is given by:
The denominator is always positive and t is also assumed to be strictly positive. Therefore, the sign of this expression depends on the numerator, which is a concave non-linear function. It has two roots:~ = 2=3 and = 1: Therefore, when 0 <~ = 2=3; we have SW F SW R < 0;
by contrast, when 1 >~ = 2=3; we have SW F SW R 0 (above the threshold~ = 2=3; Proof. Using the expressions in equations (12) and (14), welfare in a public payer's perspective under the FPR mechanism is given by:
whilst under a RP mechanism it is given by (see equations (25) and (27)):
The di¤erence in welfare under the two reimbursement mechanisms is given by: 
The denominator is always positive and t is also assumed to be strictly positive. Therefore, the sign of this expression depends on the sign of the concave non-linear function in the numerator, which is negative for 8 2 [0; 1) (in which case W F < W R ) and equal to zero when = 1 (in which By contrast, under reference pricing, social welfare depends on : as it increases, headline and e¤ective prices also increase, thus reducing consumer surplus, increasing pro…ts and (above a certain threshold) reducing government expenditure. The net e¤ect of on social welfare depends on the relative contributions of these o¤setting e¤ects: the negative e¤ect on consumer surplus and the positive e¤ect on pro…ts and government expenditure. 9 For a large range of values for ( 2 [0; 0:82) ; with the upper bound being an approximate value), the negative e¤ects dominates and thus social welfare is decreasing with ; whilst for higher values of social welfare is increasing with :
Combining these two results leads to the conclusion (Proposition 3) that a threshold exists below which RP yields a higher social welfare but above which it is FPR which yields a higher social welfare. This is not totally surprising: as increases, consumer surplus under RP decreases and approaches that of FPR (which is constant); by contrast, pro…ts net of government expenditure increase and approach those of FPR (see Figure 2) . Above that threshold, the (marginally negative)
contribution that pro…ts net of government expenditure make towards social welfare under RP with under RP, but under RP always lower than (or equal to, when = 1) under FPR. Therefore, from a public payer's perspective, RP unequivocally leads to higher welfare levels than FPR, and this is particularly so the lower is the copayment rate (or the higher is the reimbursement rate) -when consumer surplus under RP is highest (relative to FPR) and when government expenditure under FPR is also highest (relative to RP).
Discussion and conclusion
This paper studies the competitive properties of two commonly adopted reimbursement mechanisms, …xed percentage reimbursement (FPR) and reference pricing (RP), in a setting in which consumers' individual demand is price-elastic. Contrary to previous literature, we show that RP may be worse than FPR, from a social welfare viewpoint, for su¢ ciently high copayment rates.
This is because, in such a setting, RP has the counterintuitive property that higher copayment rates lead to higher prices. Policy-wise, our results throw some caution in the prevailing idea that introducing RP is likely to generate substantial bene…ts to consumers (in the form of lower prices) and will necessarily lead to higher social welfare levels. Thus, whereas we show that RP does have some advantages compared to FPR, it is unlikely to be an 'always better'reimbursement mechanism.
An important question is whether our results would hold for demand functions di¤erent from the very speci…c one we consider. The main driver of our results is the fact that, under RP, an increase in leads to a higher percentage increase in the e¤ective price of the generic and, thus, to a change in relative prices in favor of the branded pharmaceutical. This tips market shares in favor of the more expensive product. The key question, then, is whether this is su¢ cient to o¤set the direct negative impact on demand for that product that results from the higher copayment rate, creating the incentive for a price increase. Whilst we have not explicitly solved the model under alternative setups, it appears plausible that, for a large family of demand functions, it will.
Exploring the conditions in which this happens is a possible avenue for future research.
Clearly, this paper's results on pricing are amenable to empirical testing, as that which was RP is concerned. In addition, it may be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a third possible, and to the best of our knowledge yet under-researched, reimbursement mechanism: asymmetric …xed percentage reimbursement, through which the reimbursement rates are di¤erent for di¤erent types of pharmaceuticals, with generics typically attracting higher reimbursement (lower copayment)
rates. This type of mechanism has been used, for instance, in Portugal in order to help increase generic penetration at an early development stage. Whilst this type of mechanism introduces more complexity in the analysis, it may also have the merit to uncover more intricate details of …rms' pricing incentives. These are also possible next steps in our research.
